Just Another Carte Blanche? EU GSP Plus Status and Human Rights in Pakistan by Wolf, Siegfried O.
  
 
Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU) 
 
Briefing Paper 69 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Just Another Carte Blanche? EU GSP 
Plus Status and Human Rights in 
Pakistan 
 
Siegfried O. Wolf  
20 June 2014 
2 
 
About the Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU)  
 
The Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU) was established in March 2007 and relocated to 
Durham University on 1
st
 April 2013. It serves as an independent portal and neutral platform 
for interdisciplinary research on all aspects of Pakistani security, dealing with Pakistan's 
impact on regional and global security, internal security issues within Pakistan, and the 
interplay of the two. PSRU provides information about, and critical analysis of, Pakistani 
security with particular emphasis on extremism/terrorism, nuclear weapons issues, and the 
internal stability and cohesion of the state. PSRU is intended as a resource for anyone 
interested in the security of Pakistan and provides:  
 
 Briefing papers;  
 Reports;  
 Datasets;  
 Consultancy;  
 Academic, institutional and media links;  
 An open space for those working for positive change in Pakistan and for those 
currently without a voice.  
 
PSRU welcomes collaboration from individuals, groups and organisations, which share our 
broad objectives. Please contact us at contact.psru@durham.ac.uk We encourage you to look 
at the website available through: www.durham.ac.uk/psru/ 
Other PSRU Publications  
 
The following reports, papers, and briefings are freely available through the Pakistan Security 
Research Unit (PSRU):  
 
 Report Number 3. Terrorism and the Macro-economy: Evidence from Pakistan. 
 Report Number 2. Civilian Control and Democratic Transition: Pakistan’s 
Unequal Equation.  
 Report Number 1. The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan: An Introduction to the Sunni 
Jihadi Groups in Pakistan and Kashmir  
 Briefings Numbers 1-68 including:  
 Brief Number 60. Domestic Politics and Systemic Constraints in Pakistan’s India 
Policy  
 Brief Number 61. The Limited Military Utility of Pakistan’s Battlefield Use of  
Nuclear Weapons in Response to Large Scale Indian Conventional Attack  
 Brief Number 62. Getting Afghanistan Right  
 Brief Number 63. Why Karachi is a Major Source of Instability in Pakistan?  
 Brief Number 66. The Siachen Glacier and Independent Arbitration 
 Brief Number 67. Illiberal Democrats and the Marginalisation of Religious 
Minorities in Pakistan 
 Brief Number 68. Nawaz Sharif and the Crisis of Authority in Pakistan. 
 
All these papers are freely available from: www.durham.ac.uk/psru/  
 
3 
 
About the author: Siegfried O.Wolf is Director of the South Asia Democratic Forum 
(SADF) and Lecturer in International Relations and Comparative Politics in the South Asia 
Institute (SAI) at the University of Heidelberg in Germany. He may be contacted at: 
swolf@sai.uni-heidelberg.de  
Abstract:  The EU is considering offering Pakistan a Generalised Scheme of Preferences 
(GSP+) in trade which could have huge implications for the economic well-being of Pakistan. 
However this deal is tied to a package of human rights, labour rights, good governance and 
environment commitments. In the past Pakistan has signed up to such commitments but has 
failed to implement them (most starkly perhaps in relation to women’s rights and minority 
rights). This paper argues that the EU should seek to use the leverage of the GSP+ deal to 
ensure Pakistani compliance with, and implementation of, its obligations and should be 
willing to withdraw the deal if it does not. It cautions that the EU should not countenance a 
“carte blanche” in which Pakistan’s ruling elite reaps the rewards of EU trade liberalisation 
without any corresponding commitment – beyond lip service - to improve rights, governance, 
and environmental protection 
 
Introduction
1
 
 
If one believes official statements, it seems that the European Union (EU) accomplished an 
evolution in its relations with Pakistan. There is no doubt that the cooperation between Europe 
and Pakistan in terms of economic and development assistance has expanded over the last 
decades. Realizing the re-emergence of the EU as a major economic actor as well as its own 
tremendous need for development and industrialization (cf. Lieven, 2002), Pakistan started 
looking towards Europe as partner. A first agreement that was made to set up relations 
between Islamabad and Brussels was signed in 1962, which was followed by the first 
comprehensive agreement in 1976 to further intensify trade and economic ties. Currently, the 
legal and political basis for the relations between Brussels and Islamabad is the 2004 
Cooperation Agreement. Additionally, within the framework of the Lisbon treaty of 2009, the 
EU-Pakistan 5-year Engagement Plan was launched which was supposed to further widen and 
deepen the cooperation between Europe and the South Asian state. At least on paper, the 
endorsed agreement was adding to trade, economic cooperation and development, and also 
addressed the issues of regional security, counter terrorism, narco-trafficking, and organized 
crime. Another significant initial determinant of the 5-year plan was to strengthen the process 
of strengthening democratic institutions, civilian-administrative structures, and civil society. 
The signing of a memorandum of understanding on civilian capacity building for law 
enforcement in Pakistan in November 2010 has to be seen in this context. One of the 
outcomes of this document was the creation of the National Counter-Terrorism Authority 
(NACTA) and the support for provincial police forces in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and 
Punjab (cf. Sultana, 2013, 41). Furthermore, a Strategic Dialogue was envisaged to offer 
political guidance within the EU-Pakistan relations. In addition to the various signed 
documents, the EU started also to build-up its physical presence in Pakistan in the form of an 
office by the European Commission in 1985. Already three years later, the office was 
upgraded to a fully-fledged EU Delegation in order to monitor trade and development 
cooperation. In 1992, the Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department of the European 
Commission (ECHO) opened an office in Islamabad too. Besides the Delegation there is also 
the EU-Pakistan Joint Commission which is complemented by a Foreign and Security Policy 
Dialogue at senior official level to give more depth to the existing collaboration. On top of 
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that several regular meetings at the expert level are held to discuss urgent matters regarding 
international affairs, non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, and migration issues. However, the 
shaping of the European strategy with respect to Pakistan is not devoid of limitations and 
weaknesses. Apart from the intention to get more involved on the political and strategic 
dimensions, the decision makers did not go far beyond the economic paradigm which has 
traditionally defined the Pakistan-EU ties. Neither the Cold War nor the developments in the 
realm of security after “9/11” changed much in this respect. Subsequently, the EU became not 
only Pakistan’s most important trading partner. It is important to note that the EU’s activities 
in Pakistan should rather be seen in the context of economic aid and development assistance
2
 
than as part of the EU’s security framework or a sustainable political dialogue. Consequently, 
the EU interprets its relationship with Pakistan basically as a donor-recipient relationship 
(Abbasi, 2009, 3). Also the agreed EU-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, which was held for the 
first time on 5 June 2012, did not change much in operational terms besides recognizing each 
other’s strategic important. 
However, basically one can state that besides the dominant focus and a slightly increasing 
space for dialogue on security in the EU-Pakistan relations, it is obvious that the European 
perspectives on Pakistan are still determined by ‘soft power elements’ as the basis of Europe’s 
long term strategy in this South Asian country (cf. Zajaczkowski/Wolf, 2014, 131). Until 
recently, to strengthen its ‘soft power’, the EU relied heavily on the instruments of economic 
and financial aid but also on tools to strengthen the country’s democratic process and socio-
political fabric. Therefore, several attempts to get active in supporting the improvement of the 
functioning of Pakistan’s political institution were carried out. The latter initiatives found 
their expression by the deployment of election observer missions in order to strengthen the 
process of democratic transition.
3
 But despite these ‘new interests’ in certain developments of 
Pakistan’s internal affairs one must state that bilateralism between Islamabad and Brussels is 
still dominated by a clear ‘economization’. A phenomenon, which is apparently at the expense 
of Europeans’ enthusiasm to take a closer, consequent look at Pakistan’s domestic affairs, 
especially regarding human rights, labour rights, environmental protection, women’s rights 
and the rights of religious minorities (cf. USDS, 2013a, 2013b).  
Nevertheless, perhaps because of this relative political indifference on the part of the EU, 
Pakistan managed to extract several concessions that are beneficial for its economic relations 
with the EU, such as the earlier given concessionary access to the European markets (cf. Ali, 
2013). This process recently reached a new peak when Pakistan was granted the GSP 
(Generalised Scheme of Preferences) Plus status by the EU. 
 
Under this programme the beneficiary state is granted special trade preferences, namely tariff 
reductions to developing countries.
4
 The agreement is unilateral, subsequently the EU does 
not require the beneficiary countries to grant tariff reductions or other benefits from their 
sides. Basically it provides for a flexible scheme of preferences according to the individual 
needs of the recognized countries.  
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Apart from the overall disastrous socio-economic conditions of Pakistan, some moderate 
improvements in several sectors, like constructions (mainly because of reconstruction 
measures after the 2005 earthquake or the 2010 and 2011 floods)
5
, were achieved. But the 
country’s economy still suffers from endemic corruption, a weak administrative-institutional 
framework, and a lack of professionalism among its political leadership. Furthermore, the 
security situation is deteriorating, especially in the provinces of Baluchistan and Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), and in the city of Karachi (cf. ILO, 2013b). In consequence, the 
country’s miserable performance in socio-economic and human development is featured by 
slow growth, extensive power outages, excessive budget deficits, unpredictable and severe 
power load shedding continued, and draining foreign exchange reserves (cf. ADB, 2013, 105, 
110-111). According to data available, more than 60 percent of the population is living on less 
than $2 a day, while the economy is experiencing an inflation rate of 9,7 % per cent in 2012
6
 
(WDI, 2013; BTI, 2013). Therefore, it seems obvious that Pakistan is in need for the GSP 
Plus status. Among the protagonists, there are no doubts that the GSP Plus status will give a 
boost for the country’s economy (cf. Dawn, 2013a), especially the textile and clothing sector 
would benefit from unrestricted access to the EU’s single market (cf. ITC 2013, 3-4). 
Pakistani analysts have calculated that GSP Plus is expected to help Islamabad earn an 
additional USD 550-700 million per year with an increase in exports of USD 2 billion (Mirza, 
2013; Daily Times, 2013). It is estimated that 20 percent of the country’s exports would be 
allowed to enter the EU duty-free in and 70 percent would benefit from preferential rates 
(Gishkori/Rana, 2013). Furthermore, Islamabad considers the granting of GSP+ a matter of 
prestige, for it hopes that it will improve the country’s tattered international standing. 
Pakistan’s reputation suffered significantly from its image of being one of the world’s greatest 
hubs for international terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, a source of all kinds of instability 
leading to the suppression of ethnic and religious minorities and tensed relations with its 
neighbours. Especially the persistently deteriorating human rights situation in the country (cf. 
USDS, 2013b, 1), enforced by religious fanaticism and certain state agencies acting with 
impunity, is a matter of severe concern that is shared by many Pakistan observers around the 
globe. 
 
In order to achieve the GSP Plus Status, it is mandatory for Pakistan to ensure human rights 
protection and to examine ways of ensuring compliance with key human rights conventions. 
More concrete, Pakistan has to apply and prove following: First, that it has ratified a list of 27 
conventions. In order to get GSP Plus, which has to be understood as a “special incentive 
arrangement for sustainable development and good governance” (EC, 2008), one has to sign 
and ratify 16 international conventions on human rights and labour rights, and 11 conventions 
on good governance and the environment. Second, Pakistan must not demonstrate serious 
problems with the implementation of these conventions (cf. Ali, 2013). Third, that it has not 
formulated any reservations to those conventions. Furthermore, Pakistan has to commit to a 
serious of monitoring requirements. Here, Pakistan must provide comprehensive information 
concerning the required legislation and measures taken to implement them consequently.
 7
  
 
In several of these points Pakistan took some steps, at least on paper. These include the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and UN Convention against 
                                                          
5
 See for more information: Islam (2008, 3); Asian Development Bank, Pakistan Floods 2010. Preliminary 
Damage and Needs Assessment, [http://gfdrr.org/sites/gfdrr.org/files/publication/Pakistan_DNA.pdf]. 
6
 The ADB claims for 2012 even 12 per cent inflation (ADB, 2013, XXI). 
7
 See for more details: European Commission, Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP), 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/development/generalised-scheme-of-
preferences/index_en.htm. 
6 
 
Torture (UNCAT)
 8
. Pakistan also withdrew the reservation on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination as directed by the EU for acquiring GSP plus in 2014. However, one 
has to be aware that even though Islamabad has signed and ratified conventions, they have not 
been implemented. In some cases the government has lodged numerous reservations on 
human rights conventions, which must be still lifted (cf. Ali, 2013) and/or internalised in the 
mind-set of the political decision-makers. Furthermore, if one believes non-partisan human 
rights reports, pointing at the devastating facts on the ground, there is a tremendous gap 
between ‘expressed aspirations and concrete practice’ regarding the political will and the 
capacities of the national government. For example, besides the ratification of UNCAT, 
serious human rights issues still exist such as extrajudicial and targeted killings, forced 
disappearances, and torture, which affected thousands of citizens in nearly all parts of the 
country (cf. USDS, 2013b, 1; cf. AHRC, 2012, 3-6).
9
 Therefore it seems that Pakistan sees 
itself confronted with a ‘a Herculean task’ to match the requirements for GSP Plus at the 
moment but also to maintain the GSP Plus standards persistently in a long term perspective . 
 
Having this in mind, it is legitimate to raise several questions: Was it right to grant Pakistan 
the GSP Plus status in light of its human rights record and socio-economic turbulences? 
Especially given that the mandatory implementation of the 27 conventions does not appear to 
have taken place? What will the impact of receiving the GSP Plus Status have on minorities 
and marginalised groups and the issues concerning these groups? Will this be negative or 
positive? What can the EU do to ensure Pakistan’s compliance with the mandatory 
conventions? Should this trade agreement be used as a tool to direct Pakistan towards doing 
more for the protection of minority groups? How can this be achieved? What can minority 
groups do, using the GSP Plus status decision, to put them in a better position within society 
Pakistan? And last but not least, will the EU be as strict with Pakistan as it was with Sri Lanka 
as it withdrew the forerunner model of GSP Plus after not fulfilling any more respective 
mandatory requirements?  
 
In spite of all criticism, on Thursday 5 November 2013 a significant step in the direction of 
granting GSP Plus status was made as the International Trade Committee of the European 
Parliament (INTA) voted against a resolution
10
 of Southern European countries opposing the 
grant of the status to a batch of 10 newly-selected countries, including Pakistan (cf. Khan, 
2013). In addition the final decision by the European Parliament on 12 December, 2013 was 
also in favour of granting Pakistan the GSP Plus status until 2017
11
.  
 
For the time being, it seems that Pakistan’s diplomatic and lobby machinery was able to 
convince the most important decision-making circles within the EU of following things: First, 
they have the political will and the capacities to deal with the prerequisites for getting the 
GSP Plus Status. Second, to improve the weak coordination and cooperation between its own 
institutional structures in order to be able to carry out the entire GSP Plus programme. Third, 
the respective authorities were able to convince the originally ‘indifferent attitude’ of the 
private sector towards GSP Plus conditions. Apparently Pakistani companies are keen on 
receiving GSP Plus for Pakistan since it reduces competition from more advanced economies, 
for example through the additional tariff reductions. However, for several reasons the 
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enthusiasm about it remains relatively moderate (cf. Riaz, 2013). The new obligations that 
arise from the GSP Plus Status, like the respect of labour rights as well as environmental 
protection, will create challenges for some Pakistani entrepreneurs. Here, it is important to 
note that large sections of the Pakistani industry have not been able to invest much in capacity 
building in the last years and some parts are inoperative due to gas and power shortages (cf. 
Dawn, 2013b; cf. ITC 2013).
12
 By making their own cost-benefit analyses, they may still not 
be convinced that the expected additional profit from an increase in exports to the EU will 
have the potential to redeem the extra costs for respecting the international standards. This is 
gaining significance, since Pakistan has ratified 34 conventions of the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) but also here no remarkable and substantial efforts were made to ensure 
their implementation. For example, in March 2012 the Pakistan Parliament passed a new 
federal Industrial Relations Act (IRA)
13
 which was supposed to address the conventions (and 
concerns) of ILO conventions. However, it IRA was only implemented in the Islamabad 
Capital Territory but not in the four provinces
14
, where the main economic centres are located. 
As a result, the bulk of the country’s workforces are not covered by federal labour regulations 
of any kind but remain under provincial labour law which partly conflicts with international 
conventions (USDS 2013b, 54-55).
15
 Another remarkable case is the National Plan of Action 
for Decent Work (NPADW 2010-2015)
16
 which is supposed to plan several reform measures 
with the Decent Work Program of ILO (cf. ILO, 2013a). But their operationalization is far 
away from being satisfactory. Therefore it appears that the role of the federal government to 
ensure compliance with ILO conventions remains unclear (USDS, 2013b). This raises doubts 
about whetherthe country is able to meet international labour standards at all. At least for the 
moment it appears that ‘enforcement of labour laws [has] remained weak, in large part due to 
lack of resources and political will’ (USDS, 2013b, 56).  
Fourth, it seems that the Pakistani government was also able to give an impression that the 
human rights situation in the country is improving. But as already indicated above, this does 
not reflect the realities on the ground. Religious and ethnic minority rights are often bluntly 
violated and the rights and interests of certain regions like Balochistan or Gilgit-Baltistan are 
treated with contempt. In brief, the human rights situation in Pakistan remains murky. 
 
This is not a new phenomenon but rather a continuation of a trend which emerged over the 
last decades. Seen in this light, 2013 marks just another unfortunate highlight, despite the 
promising general elections last May. If one believes the international media, this event is 
supposed to be the long desired critical juncture able to break finally with the autocratic 
political patterns of the past.
17
 Undoubtedly, the first transfer of power between two civilian 
governments is a milestone in the country’s chequered political history. The remarkable 
enthusiasm among the Pakistani people about casting one's vote is a promising indicator for a 
potential process of democratic transition in future. However, the human rights violations 
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continued unabatedly over the last months: Intimidation of and violence against communities 
of religious minorities and no serious efforts to combat them – it remains the norm rather than 
the exception. This finds its expression in an increase of attacks against religious minorities in 
quantitative and qualitative terms. It is important to note that Hindu, Christian, Sikh, Parsi 
(Zoroastrians), Ahmadiyya and Shia communities and numerous other religious
18
 minorities 
are persecuted from two different directions: From one side by several state actors, especially 
from the omnipresent security agencies, namely the army, including paramilitary forces, 
intelligence forces and the police. But also from another side by non-state actors, foremost 
militant Islamic fundamentalists like the Taliban (cf. GHRD, 2012, 16; cf. AHRC, 2012, 12-
22).  
This can happen because of a multitude of reasons: To begin with, the current constitution and 
other laws officially restrict religious freedom (USDS, 2013a, 1; UKHO, 2013, 116-120). 
Most important in this context is that it seems that the government and its respective state 
agencies have the political will and the capacities to enforce many of these restrictions. This is 
a phenomenon which one can find only rudimentarily when it comes to the protection of 
religious minorities (cf. AI, 2012). Although the constitution (Article 20) guarantees 
“Freedom to profess religion and to manage religious institutions” and that “(a) every citizen 
shall have the right to profess, practice and propagate his religion”; and “(b) every religious 
denomination and every sect thereof shall have the right to establish, maintain and manage its 
religious institutions”.19 Furthermore, “adequate provisions shall be made for minorities to 
profess and practice their religious beliefs freely” the state prefers to put emphasis on other 
provisions of the constitution and laws which limit this right of religious freedom.
20
 There is 
no doubt that within the country’s legal framework tends to prefer protecting the religious 
majority at the expense of the rights of the religious minorities. The most dramatic and 
prominent example thereof is the existence and application of the Blasphemy Laws. No other 
law has had as grave implications for religious minorities as have the blasphemy laws. (cf. 
Gishkori/Rana, 2013). Any state functionary or private person can file a complaint against any 
person under these laws. In almost all cases, no solid written proof is required, just the 
offensive remarks and a few witnesses are enough to get a conviction. Therefore, blasphemy 
laws have been repeatedly misused against religious minorities (cf. GHRD, 2002, 7-9; cf. AI, 
2012), especially Christians and Hindus, by religious fanatics, especially in the last five years. 
Also the Ahmadiyya have to suffer from the misuse of laws (cf. Shaun/Valentine, 2009; 24-
30; cf. Valentine, 2008). Here, Islamists are using the so called ‘anti-Ahmadiyya’ provisions 
of the penal code to justify abuses and discriminations. To catalyse the discriminatory effects 
Islamists and Islamist-friendly media spread their ideology of hate in derogatory reports 
against Ahmadiyya, Christians, Hindus, Jews, and other communities in major Urdu dailies.  
 
Additionally, apart from the unfortunate domestic legal framework, the situations for the 
religious minorities are getting even more complicated when it comes to international human 
rights commitments. Much improvement is needed due to the inadequate implementation of 
the human rights treaties that the country had ratified. In this direction, several human rights 
organizations are complaining that the government of Pakistan failed in particular to 
implement “the recommendations made to ensure fair trials, punish cases of abuse by security 
forces, and ensure that victims have access to protection and redress” (AHRC, 2012). The 
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Human Rights Commission of Pakistan is going even a step further by stating that “no 
progress was made at all in implementing treaties” (HRCP, 2013, 1).  
 
It does not come as a surprise, that Pakistan’s executive as well as legislative have only 
limited interests in protecting the rights to religious freedom. But it is astonishing that also the 
country’s judiciary remains silent about the situation of non-Muslims in Pakistan. This lack of 
sufficient laws and political as well as judicial interests in protecting religious minorities is 
gaining particular importance if one looks at the pervasive instability, widespread corruption, 
and terrorist & counter-terrorist activities in the country and the frailty of the government to 
maintain law and order. The numerous attacks on certain religious communities, for example 
the Shias including the Hazaras, during the last elections or the recent bomb plots against 
Christian churches (cf. Boone, 2013) stem from a lack of rule of law and a failure of the 
government to provide adequate protection for prominent protagonists of religious freedom. 
Here, the strategy of the militant Islamists becomes crystal clear: to eliminate the religious 
minorities or to force them out of the country to create a homogenous Muslim [Sunni] society. 
In order to continue their activities ‘undisturbed’, the religious fundamentalists are not only 
directed at threatening and attacking state institutions but also at silencing political and 
religious tolerance in the country. This finds its expression in the fact that people willing to 
defend human rights are becoming the target of violent harassment and attacks in an 
increasing degree and are left without sufficient protection (cf. GHRD, 2012, 16; cf. AHRC, 
2012, 6-7). The 2011 target killings of then Punjab Governor Salman Taseer and Federal 
Minister for Minorities Shahbaz Bhatti, both of whom spoke against blasphemy laws and 
interreligious dialogue, are two of the most prominent and traumatic examples thereof (cf. 
AHRC, 2012, 6).  
 
Most significant in this context is that the state fails to investigate, arrest and prosecute 
perpetrators of violations and societal abuses. In contrast they enjoy impunity to a large extent 
and feel motivated to continue with attacks against religious minorities (cf. AHRC, 2012). In 
consequence, there is a tremendous increase in vigilantism and mob violence, especially 
against the Christians which are apparently the new target of terrorism in Pakistan (cf. Boone, 
2013; cf. Gregory, 2008). 
There is another major causality why the state remains so restive is the growing religious 
fundamentalism and militant extremism in the country (cf. AI, 2012). Pakistan did not make 
any significant move in overcoming the “pervasive religious intolerance that undermined the 
freedom of religious belief”. Furthermore, the reluctance of the government regarding the 
protection of religious minorities is creating an atmosphere in which religious intolerance can 
grow because it is either tolerated or ignored (cf. HRCP, 2012; 2011). Consequently, the 
government’s failure or delay in addressing religious hostility by societal actors fostered 
intolerance is paving the ground for even more religious extremism and acts of violence (cf. 
HRCP, 2012; 2011).  
 
To sum up, there is without a doubt a need that the EU enhances its political dialogue and 
interaction with the Pakistani leadership beyond aid and development issues. Especially with 
these Pakistanis who got elected through free and fair polls. This might help to strengthen the 
civilians vis-à-vis to the top echelon of the country’s powerful army. In this context, it will 
also mark a significant counterpoint to the traditional US strategy of dealing with Pakistan 
mainly on military-to-military contacts and might open opportunities to influence political 
processes in Pakistan. However, the rapprochement between Pakistan and the EU should not 
be realized at all costs, especially not at the expense of the human rights and religious 
minorities, or the ignorance of the rapid grow of Islamic fundamentalism as well as the role of 
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the Pakistan’s government21 in these phenomena. Therefore, the GSP Plus Status must serve 
as an instrument to pressure Islamabad in working towards a change of unfortunate 
trajectories in order to build a functional democracy. This is not possible without the 
unconditional respect of human rights including women’s rights, and the consequent 
eradication of religious extremism. Or in the words of the head of European Parliament 
subcommittee on Human Rights Ana Gomes, that Pakistan needs “decisive actions to combat 
all forms of discrimination” (Gishkori/Rana, 2013).  
 
It is therefore important for the decision-makers in the EU to demonstrate the political will to 
implement the opportunities given by GSP Plus to them, foremost to use the option of 
withdrawal in case of no improvements. In other words, Brussels should not hesitate to take 
away the benefits of GSP Plus if Pakistan doesn’t meet the requirements. The case of Sri 
Lanka,
22
 which lost GSP Status (temporarily) after violations of its conventions, should serve 
as a reminder for Pakistan’s elites that the EU is willing and able to react according the 
recommendations of the strict monitoring mechanism of the implementation of GSP plus 
requirements.
23
 Here, the EU must also take into account the likelihood that the ‘non-
economic motivation’ of the new civilian government in intensifying cooperation is also 
much an outcome of the growing anti-American sentiments in Pakistan and less rooting in the 
convictions of European values. Furthermore on the European side, there is the inherent threat 
that GSP Plus will be interpreted just as a continuation of the economically determined EU-
Pakistan relations. In consequence, issues like the improvement of human rights, labour 
conditions, environment protection, and situation of minorities will remain embedded in the 
appellative rhetoric of European politicians without any substantial political consequences. 
However, at the moment it seems that there are signs for change in this attitude of 
indifference. But this is most likely not because of a newly discovered severe interest in 
improving Pakistan’s human rights and labour standards or socio-political conditions of 
disadvantaged communities. Rather, the growing emergence of security related issues seems 
to be the trigger for Europeans looking deeper at Pakistan’s domestic issues as well as for the 
assessment of using the GSP Plus status as an instrument to achieve certain political goals; for 
example to support the EU in bringing stability to the region, especially in the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border areas after the withdrawal of major parts of US/NATO combat troops 
from Afghanistan.  
 
In addition, Islamabad has to realize that the granting of concessions and aid come hand in 
hand with responsibilities. The arguments that have persistently been made over the last 
decades – that changes need time, and the security of the state must deserve the primary 
attention (which absorbs of cause the bulk of the national resources) – cannot be used 
anymore as an excuse to not deliver the implementation of international commitments and 
domestic political-decision making. Therefore, the reiterated demands for more 
(unconditional) funds successfully addressed towards the international community by 
concurrent negligence of its own homework or performing basic duties (like paying taxes or 
energy bills), must come to an end. Otherwise, the establishment in Pakistan will interpret 
GSP Plus as just another ‘carte blanche’ for financial and economic benefits.  
 
Bibliography: 
                                                          
21
 At the national as well as provincial levels. 
22
 The EU suspended Sri Lanka’s GSP Plus Status for Sri Lanka after violations of the human rights conventions 
in the context of the armed confrontation with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leading to their 
military defeat. 
23
 See European Commission, 15.2.2010, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=515. 
11 
 
Abbasi, Nadia M. (2009), The EU and Democracy Building in Pakistan, International Institute 
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance: Stockholm, 2009; 
 [http://www.idea.int/resources/analysis/loader.cfm?csmodule=security/getfile&pageid=
37937]. 
ADB (2013), Asian Development Outlook 2013 Update: Governance and Public Service 
Delivery, Asian Development Bank (ADB), October 2013; 
 [http://www.adb.org/publications/asian-development-outlook-2013-update-governance-
and-public-service-delivery?ref=countries/pakistan/publications]. 
AHRC (2012), Pakistan: failure of the institutions related to the rule of law provides impunity 
to the perpetrators of violations human rights, Asian Human Rights Commission, 2012; 
 [http://www.humanrights.asia/news/ahrc-news/AHRC-STM-261-2012]. 
Ali, Sara (2013), EU GSP plus scheme, Daily Times, 12.1.2013;  
[http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013\01\12\story_12-1-2013_pg3_5]. 
AI, 2012, Pakistan must do more to protect religious minorities, Press Release, Amnesty 
International, 1.3.2012; 
 [http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/pakistan-authorities-must-do-
more-protect-religious-minorities-2012-03-01]. 
Azhar, Mobeen, 'Hell on Earth': Inside Quetta's Hazara community, BBC, 1.5.2013; 
 [http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-22248500]. 
Boone, Jon (2013), Pakistan church bomb: Christians mourn 85 killed in Peshawar suicide 
attack, The Guardian, 24.9.2013; 
 [http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/23/pakistan-church-bombings-christian-
minority]. 
BTI (2012), BTI 2012. Pakistan Country Report, Bertelsmann Stiftung: Gütersloh, 2012; 
 [http://www.bti-
project.de/fileadmin/Inhalte/reports/2012/pdf/BTI%202012%20Pakistan.pdf]. 
Daily Times (2013), GSP Plus status to boost export by about $2bn, Daily Times, 15.11.2013; 
 [http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013\11\15\story_15-11-
2013_pg5_15]. 
Dawn (2013b), Insufficient capacity: GSP Plus status for Pakistan, 8.11.2013; 
 [http://dawn.com/news/1054915/insufficient-capacity-gsp-plus-status-for-pakistan]. 
Dawn (2013a), Pakistan likely to get EU’ GSP Plus status by end of year, Dawn, 17.9.2013; 
[http://dawn.com/news/1043401/pakistan-likely-to-get-eus-gsp-plus-status-by-end-of-
year]. 
EC (2013), The EU’s new Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP), European Commission, 
22 Jul 2013; 
[http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/september/tradoc_151705.%2013-
07%20GSP%20InfoPack%20Update%20Final.pdf]. 
EC (2012), Press Release: EU-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, European Commission (EC), 
IP/12/566, 5.6.2012; 
 [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-566_en.htm]. 
EC (2008), Press Release, The EC Special Incentive Arrangement for Sustainable 
Development and Good Governance (GSP+) 2009-2011, European Commission (EC) - 
MEMO/08/777 - 09/12/2008, 9.12.2008; 
 [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-08-777_en.htm]. 
EP (2013), Plenary sitting. Motion for a Resolution, European Parliament, 27.9.2013; 
[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/inta/re/1003/1003608/
1003608en.pdf]. 
EUDP (2013), European Union Delegation to Pakistan, Press Release: EU trade preferences 
(GSP+) for Pakistan passes test in the European Parliament's Committee on 
International Trade, but the final decision is still pending, 7.11.2013, 
12 
 
[http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/pakistan/documents/press_corner/20131107_01_en.p
df]. 
GHRD (2012), Annual Human Rights Report 2012, Global Human Rights Defense (GHRD), 
2012; 
 [http://www.ghrd.org/action-centre/reports/annual-reports/]. 
Gregory, Shaun R. The Christian Minority in Pakistan: Issues and Options, Pakistan Security 
Research Unit (PSRU), 17.8.2008. 
Gregory, Shaun R. and Simon R. Valentine (2009), Pakistan: The Situation of Religious 
Minorities, Writenet, independent analysis, May 2009; 
 [http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b01856e2.html]. 
Gishkori, Zahid and Shahbaz Rana (2008), Capital Punishment: EU cautions against lifting 
moratorium, The Express Tribune, 28.8.2013; 
[http://tribune.com.pk/story/596285/capital-punishment-eu-cautions-against-lifting-
moratorium/]. 
HRCP (2013), State of Human Rights in 2012, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 
(HRCP), Lahore, March 2013; 
 [http://hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/wp-content/pdf/AR2012.pdf]. 
HRCP (2011), Perils of faith. Report of HRCP Working Group on Communities Vulnerable 
because of their Beliefs, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, December 2011; 
[http://hrcp-web.org/publication/book/rerils-of-faith/]. 
HRCP (2011), Life at Risk. Report of HRCP Working Group on Communities Vulnerable 
because of their Beliefs, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, April 2011; 
[http://hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/wp-content/pdf/ff/5.pdf]. 
Khan, Mubarak Zeb (2013), Way opens for grant of GSP+, Dawn, 7.11.2013; 
[http://dawn.com/news/1054691/way-opens-for-grant-of-gsp]. 
ILO (2013b), Pakistan Labour Market Update, International Labour Organization (ILO), 
Country Office for Pakistan, September 2013, 
 [http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---ilo-
islamabad/documents/publication/wcms_222834.pdf] 
ILO (2013a), Country Program. Decent Work in Pakistan, International Labour Organization; 
[http://www.ilo.org/islamabad/country/lang--en/index.htm]. 
Islam, Shada (2008), Building democracy and fighting extremism in Pakistan: a role for the 
EU, Policy Brief, European Policy Centre, April 2008; 
 [http://gees.org/documentos/Documen-02974.pdf]. 
Lieven, Anatol (2002), The Pressure on Pakistan, Foreign Affairs (January/February 2002), p-
115. 
 [http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/57623/anatol-lieven/the-pressures-on-pakistan]. 
Mirza, Javed (2013), Government can earn $700m through GSP Plus status: experts, The 
News International, 15.10.2013; 
[http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-3-208248-Government-can-earn-$700m-
through-GSP-Plus-status-experts]. 
Riaz, Muhammad (2013), Pakistan unlikely to benefit from GSP Plus status, Business 
Recorder, 7.11.2013; 
 [http://www.towelassociation.com/news-
clippings/Pakistan%20unlikely%20to%20benefit%20from%20GSP%20Plus%20status%20
PTA.pdf]. 
Sajjad, Farrukh (2013), Eligibility for sustainable GSP Plus facility, Dawn, 28.10.2013, 
 [http://dawn.com/news/1052260/eligibility-for-sustainable-gsp-plus-facility]. 
13 
 
ITC (2013), Enhancing Pakistan’s Trading Benefits from the Propsed EU GSP Plus Scheme, 
International Trade Center (ITC), European Union Trade Related Technical Assistance 
(TRTA II) Programme, 2013; 
 [http://www.intracen.org/uploadedFiles/intracen.org/Content/About_ITC/Press/Articles/G
SP.pdf]. 
UKHO (2013), Pakistan. Country of Origin Information (COI) Report, United Kingdom 
Home Office (UKHO), 9.8.2013; 
[http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/coi/pakistan/]. 
UNDP (2013), Human Development Report 2013, United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), 2013; 
 [http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2013/]. 
USDS (2013a), International Religious Freedom Report for 2012. Pakistan, United States 
Department of State (USDS), Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2013, 
[http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm#wrapper] 
USDS (2013b), Pakistan 2012. Human Rights Report. United States Department of State, 
Human Rights and Labor, 2013; 
[http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2012&dlid=2044
09#wrapper]. 
Valentine, Simon R. The Ahmadiyya Jama´at: A Persecuted Sect in Pakistan, Brief Number 
35, Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU), 11.6.2008; 
 [https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/psru/briefings/archive/Brief35.pdf9]. 
Wolf, Siegfried O. (2013c), General elections in Pakistan: Elections yes, democracy not yet!, 
The Independent, Panorama, Dhaka: Bangladesh, 24.5.2013, 14; 
 [http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/savifadok/2853/]. 
Wolf, Siegfried O. (2013b), Will elections be enough for democracy in Pakistan?, The 
Independent, Panorama, Dhaka: Bangladesh, 10.5.2013, 14; 
 [http://archiv.ub.uni-
heidelberg.de/savifadok/2854/1/SOW.PreElectionDemocracyPakistan.20131005.pdf]. 
Wolf, Siegfried O. (2013a), General Elections in Pakistan 2013 – Some Reflections, APSA 
Comment No. 5, Foundation for Applied Political Science of South Asia (APSA), 
Heidelberg, May 2013. 
 [http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/savifadok/2801/] 
WDI (2013), World Development Indicators 2013, The World Bank, 2013; 
 [http://data.worldbank.org/country/Pakistan]. 
Wolf, Siegfried O./Casaca, Paulo/Flanagan, Anne J. and Catia Rodriguez (Eds.) (2014), The 
Merits of Regional Cooperation. The Case of South Asia. Springer: Heidelberg, 2014. 
Zajaczkowski, Jakub and Siegfried O. Wolf, EU-Pakistan Relations: European Perspectives at 
the Turn of the Twenty-First Century, in Wolf, Siegfried O./Casaca, Paulo/Flanagan, 
Anne J. and Catia Rodriguez (Eds.) (2014), The Merits of Regional Cooperation. The 
Case of South Asia. Springer: Heidelberg, 2014, pp. 153.  
 
 
